Trump Refuses to Renew Trade Pact With Canada and Mexico
On the very day of the deadline, the White House declined to extend USMCA for another sixteen years, pushing the deal Trump himself signed into a cycle of annual reviews.

- Washington declined on July 1, the very day of the deadline, to renew USMCA for another 16 years.
- Instead of an extension, the pact enters a system of annual reviews that Mexico and Canada see as a source of instability.
- Trump cites the trade deficit as his main objection: 197 billion dollars with Mexico and 48.3 billion with Canada in 2025.
- US and Mexico bilateral talks resume in the week of July 20, while Washington and Ottawa have not yet even begun.
A decision that at first glance looks like a North American domestic affair deserves to be read across Europe as a lesson in how Washington now treats even its closest partners: President Donald Trump has refused to extend the agreement he himself signed in his first term, and in doing so he has signalled to every smaller economic actor, including countries negotiating market access with Brussels, that long-term trade arrangements have entered an era of permanent reassessment. The agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada, known as USMCA, was due to be renewed on July 1 for another sixteen years, but the Office of the US Trade Representative announced that the pact would not be extended in its current form.
Rather than an automatic renewal, the deal now moves into a mechanism of annual reviews in which the question of its core provisions is reopened every year. Formally, USMCA remains in force for another decade, all the way to 2036, provided no party withdraws, yet it is precisely this yearly cycle of scrutiny that introduces the uncertainty both Mexico and Canada had sought to avoid. For Washington, however, that mechanism is leverage: it allows any imbalance in trade to become the subject of a fresh contest.
Why is Trump refusing his own agreement?
The rationale coming out of the White House comes down to a single figure, the trade deficit. According to the data the administration cites, the United States ran a shortfall of 197 billion dollars in trade with Mexico and 48.3 billion dollars with Canada during 2025. Trump presents that imbalance as proof that his partners gain more than they give, and uses it to argue that Washington has no essential need of its neighbours’ economies to the degree that they depend on the American market.
This is the same pattern that defined his first term, when the North American Free Trade Agreement was replaced by USMCA itself. Now, at the end of the planned six-year cycle, that deal is not being renewed but placed under standing supervision. Unlike conventional diplomacy, which strives for predictability, this approach deliberately removes it, wagering that insecurity hands the negotiating advantage to the side with the larger market.
Mexican official Marcelo Ebrard warned that annual reviews create instability and complicate the efforts of Mexico and Canada to reduce their reliance on China, since investors lack the long-term certainty without which supply chains are hard to relocate. That opens a paradox: an instrument meant to strengthen the North American bloc against Beijing could now hamper the very shift it was designed to encourage.
What the decision means for talks and for Europe
The negotiations are not being broken off, but they are being fragmented. The United States and Mexico will continue bilateral talks in the week beginning July 20, while Washington and Ottawa, according to available information, have not yet sat down at all. The move from a trilateral format to two separate channels is not a technical detail; it shifts the balance of power, because each country now bargains alone, without a common position that would lend it greater weight.
For a European perspective the message is unambiguous. If Washington treats its geographically and militarily closest allies this way, then Brussels’ own talks with the United States over tariffs and market access enter a phase in which nothing is taken as permanently settled. For small economies, Serbia’s among them, that tie their future to the European market, this is a reminder that the transatlantic bond no longer guarantees a stable framework, but rather a series of short-term deals open to review.
The question that reaches beyond North America remains: if even an agreement one president signed in person is no longer safe from his own second thoughts, what exactly are those who sit across the table from Washington relying on?



