Kremlin Touts 'Real War With NATO' as Offensive Stalls
Moscow rebrands the war in Ukraine as a conflict with NATO ahead of a summit, even as independent assessments show the offensive has all but stalled at heavy cost.

- Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia is in effect waging a war against NATO because of Western support for Ukraine.
- Putin claims Russian forces seized more than 3,000 square kilometers in 2026, while the independent Institute for the Study of War estimates just 97 square kilometers between January and July.
- Ukraine's military estimates Russia suffered around 39,490 casualties in June alone, more than it can recruit.
- The Kremlin reportedly plans a partial mobilization only after parliamentary elections set for September 18 to 20.
For Serbia, a country that has spent years carefully balancing its energy and political ties between Moscow and Brussels, the rhetorical shift now coming from the Kremlin is more than semantics. When Moscow stops calling its conflict in Ukraine a “special military operation” and begins openly describing it as a war against NATO, the entire framework for weighing every subsequent move changes, and that concerns even those countries in the Balkans that try to stay outside bloc logic.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said this week that Russia is in reality fighting a war against NATO, arguing that the West, through its weapons and intelligence support, is directly involved in Ukraine’s resistance. Alongside Peskov, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova and General Staff chief Valery Gerasimov are using similar language, so that the vocabulary of the Russian leadership stops being defensive and becomes a way of preparing the public for a longer conflict.
Why is Moscow changing its language now?
The rebranding of the war comes at a moment when independent battlefield assessments paint a very different picture from the one offered by the Russian president. Vladimir Putin claims Russian forces seized more than 3,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in 2026. The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, which tracks the front line daily, estimates the actual advance from January to July at just 97 square kilometers. The gap between those two figures is not a statistical nuance but a measure of how far the official narrative in Moscow has drifted from what is happening on the ground.
Gerasimov, for his part, has accused Kyiv of convincing its Western partners of successes that do not exist, shifting the burden of proof onto Ukraine even as Russia’s own objectives remain far from met. This kind of reversal usually surfaces when a military plan is stalling and the political cost of that standstill has to be explained at home.
That cost, judging by Ukrainian estimates, is extremely high. According to Ukraine’s military, Russia suffered around 39,490 casualties in June alone, exceeding its monthly recruitment capacity. When the number of soldiers lost outpaces the number of new arrivals, an army enters a zone of attrition from which it is hard to recover without a fresh wave of mobilization.
What renaming the war means for the rest of Europe
This is exactly where rhetoric and reality meet. The Kremlin is reportedly preparing a partial mobilization, but only after parliamentary elections scheduled for September 18 to 20, so as to avoid a political blow before the vote. If the war is declared in advance to be a conflict with NATO, calling up additional troops is more easily justified as national defense rather than an extension of an operation that was supposed to be brief.
That the human cost of the conflict remains a daily reality was shown by the latest attack on the Ukrainian capital. On Sunday, Russian missiles and drones killed at least 11 people in Kyiv and badly damaged residential buildings, continuing strikes on civilian targets in parallel with the diplomatic messaging from Moscow.
For European capitals, including those that follow Serbian foreign policy, this shift raises an uncomfortable question. If Moscow officially treats the war as a conflict with NATO, then in its reading every new weapons delivery to Ukraine becomes an act of a belligerent party, and the space for a diplomatic channel narrows precisely when it is needed most.
The question that follows concerns more than Kyiv and Moscow: is the Kremlin’s new war rhetoric preparation for escalation or an attempt to mask a battlefield defeat with words, and how should Serbia position itself if the line between East and West sharpens further?



